A Short Historical Overview
(A Meta-narrative?)
For centuries the Fars region had been a multi-ethnic region,
in which tribal and pastoral nomadic groups composed a large part of the
population.
Turkic-speaking pastoral nomadic tribal groups began entering central
and southern Iran during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Historical
movement of larger and smaller groups of pastoral nomadic households
of different ethnic backgrounds, including Turks, into and out
of the Fars region continued up to the nineteenth century. The
Qashqai, as a large tribal unit, dates back at least to the early
eighteenth century, when some Turkish(Turki)-speaking tribal groups in
the region existed under the name Qashqai and leadership
of the head(s) of a certain lineage called Shahilu.

Photo: A. Shiva, 2002
In addition to pastoralism for use and exchange, various nomadic households of the Fars region during the nineteenth century relied on different combinations of a variety of economic resources and relations--such as agriculture, handicrafts production, and gathering; all these also for use and exchange. Exchange of labor (in a variety of contracts with property owners), trade, providing protection and transportation facilities for traders, and, for some, banditry and raiding, were other potential household economic resources.
During the nineteenth century the Qashqai was gradually transformed
into a large tribal confederacy composed of, mainly, Turkish-speaking pastoral nomads.
Their summer pastures stretched to areas in central Iran, and
their winter pastures to areas close to the Persian Gulf. Many
Turki(Turkish)-speaking tribal groups, as well as groups belonging
to other ethnic groups in the region, were integrated into the
Qashqai. The non-Turk groups, in time, adopted the language and
other ethnic identity markers of the Qashqai. Perhaps more than a quarter of the region's population was pastoral nomadic about mid nineteenth century.
Generally speaking, during the nineteenth century the Qashqai became increasingly, though with ebbs and
flows, hierarchical and centralized. Its official political hierarchy
was part of the regional state structure for purposes of 'tax and order." Growth of political centralization and expansion
of Qashqai population and territory in this period paralleled
changes in the larger regional political economy. There was an
increasing articulation of the region's political economy with
the world market. This process included rise in production of
agricultural and pastoral products for the market and consumption
of imported goods, growth in monetization of the administrative
system and the economy, relative centralization of the state apparatus,
spread of private forms of land ownership, and expansion of mercantile,
financial, and landed capital. Though Iran never became an official
colony of either Russia or Britain, Fars and other regions in
southern Iran were under the economic and political influence
of Britain during this period.
The economic changes mentioned above were unevenly effective among the region's various local communities, including various Qashqai groups. The whole nineteen century transformation process
was complex, uneven, and paradoxical. Alongside Western political
and economic sway, the modern Iranian nation and nationalism gradually
emerged. Likewise, parallel to the emergence of the Iranian nation,
some modern Iranian ethnic groups took their beginnings. In Fars,
abreast the general trend of expansion and centralization of the
state and some tribal groupings, dispersion of some other larger
tribes, internal tribal strife and acts of rebellion, brigandage,
and "lawlessness,” specially in certain periods, intensified.
The Qashqai as an Ethnic Group
The Qashqai are distinguished from other ethnic
groups in the region by identification
as Turk, or Qashqai, by themselves and others. Their identity includes a common political history, present
social ties, and a shared cultural and linguistic heritage. Most Qashqai
are, at least, bilingual in Persian (Farsi).
Other major ethnic groups in
Fars in the nineteenth century were the Tajik (non-tribal and
Persian speaking villagers and city dwellers, also called Tat,
or sometimes referred to as Fars), and the Lurs, and
the Arabs (or later the Arab-Basseri). The Lurs and the Arabs were also considered "tribal."
There are other non-Qashqai but Turki-speaking communities
in Fars. Three out of five large tribal groups that were formed into the Khamseh confederacy of eastern Fars in the second half
of the last century are Turki-speaking, so are many smaller settled
and semi-settled communities throughout Fars. These three Turki-speaking
tribes of eastern Fars (sometimes referred to as "Turk-e
Arab"), regarded themselves as culturally close to the Qashqai,
and generally sided with the majority of them in some of the major
social dramas of the region's history during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. There were many small Turki-speaking settled
rural communities scattered throughout Fars, but for many Qashqai
these were not considered to be "Turk proper," and in some context
referred to them as Tajik or Tat (non-tribal peasants). Ethnic and tribal
affiliation shifts were common historical phenomena, so were nomads becoming
peasants or peasants becoming nomads and joining tribal groups.

Photo: A. Shiva,
2002
Premodern Social Structure
I view the Qashqai "premodern," or "traditional" tribal social structure as characterized by a variety of interrelated "aspects."
We may call these aspects “structures” and “models” of, or “discourses” on, the Qashqai “traditional tribal society."
i) There was a hierarchical formal administrative structure which integrated the Qashqai with the state structure (for taxing and “order” purposes).
There were also the hierarchies of (ii) the status groups and of (iii) the socio-economic classes.
There was also (iv) a segmental or branching structure to the whole confederacy and its divisions.
Heads of bandits and raiding groups were also men of power, or, to use Tapper’s (1983) phrase for tribal societies of Iran and Afghanistan, there existed (v) a tribal chief/bandit-rebel dialectic.
Qashqai heads of groups of bandits, rebels, and raiders, similar to the tribal chiefs, were engaged in appropriation and distribution of surplus, and punishment. Typically, tribal rebels could become chiefs; the reverse was also the case.
(vi) Individual and group networks constituted another major aspect of social life. These networks brought individuals and groups across tribal groupings together. They also brought individuals and groups from pastoral, rural, and urban background in social contact. Regional alliances included urban, rural, and nomadic/tribal forces.
(vii) The political field at local, regional, and national levels was characterized by a flexible system of alliances and counter-alliances. Over time, many individuals and groups changed their political and even tribal and ethnic affiliation.
Flexibility of alliances was even practiced during the course of social dramas, sometimes suddenly in the climax of dramas. Narratives of so many social dramas point to moments of impromptu change of political side, not only by main actors, but also by the larger population, who are the audience, but also actors. Regional alliances normally contained urban, nomadic, and rural forces.
The Qashqai were active participants in the country-side political space. Their migratory routes pass by the region’s capital, Shiraz. In many regional and national upheavals, both during the nineteenth and modern (twentieth century) eras, the Qashqai also took part in the dramas staged in urban political space.
Modern Period
A transitional or liminal period, covering the first
quarter of the twentieth century, dramatically divided the Iranian "premodern"
and "modern" historical periods. The economic, political, cultural, and social backgrounds for such a transformation were set in the nineteenth century, particularly its later decades. But, it was during these dramatic quarter-of-a-century-long years of
the Constitutional revolution and the First World War, that Iranian
nationalism was communicated to larger segments of the society.
In Fars and among the Qashqai, during the nationalist and anti-British
movement of the war years modern ideas on national identity were disseminated,
contested and reconstructed among the larger population.
During much of the twentieth century, the expanding
and centralizing modern nation-state dominated the Iranian political
field. Populations with a tribal and/or minority ethnic background were
diversely reconstructed and transformed in a context characterized by various discourses on nationalism--combined with new ideas on the state,
ethnicity, Islam, popular participation, social justice, gender
relations and progress. This trend, part of a larger process of
change usually termed "modernity" (or rather multiple and contested modernities)
intensified and expanded since the sixties. Similar to many other
dominantly non-urban populations in the country, incorporation
of Qashqai masses in the national politics as Iranian citizens has further
augmented during and after the Islamic revolution of 1978-79.
Sedentarization of Qashqai nomads, and rise in their
involvement in non-pastoral and new economic activities,
has intensified since the nineteen sixties. Presently, the Qashqai
form mainly settled and semi-settled households. Settled Qashqai
are dispersed throughout the region, but mostly in rural and urban
locations in north-, mid-, and south-central Fars. There are some
Qashqai who reside outside southern Iran, and indeed throughout
the global village.
With the dissolution and transformation of tribal hierarchies and groupings in the last few decades, the importance of social networks in the way Qashqai construct their daily lives has increased. Transformations of the last few decades have brought new channels of establishing networks in urban areas and in the state apparatus.
Qashqai population of today is estimated to be over one million; up to a million and half. The definition of who could
be, or is considered Qashqai, is contextual, multiple, and variable
in time and space. This estimate is based on a more inclusive
definition. There are no "reliable" statistics on the changing divisions into settled, nomadic
and semi-nomadic components.